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ON VIEWING THE COURTS AS JUNIOR PARTNERS
OF CONGRESS IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
CASES: AN ESSAY CELEBRATING THE
SCHOLARSHIP OF DANIEL J. MELTZER
Richard H. Fallon, Jr.*
Dan Meltzer liked to tell the story of an economist who, upon being
reminded that many non-profit institutions thrive as the result of the labors
of volunteers and employees who work at below-market rates, scoffed: “Yes, I
know it works in practice, but does it work in theory?” Dan liked the story
because it expressed his bemusement at academics who invert what he
regarded as the proper relationship between theory and practice. Dan
looked askance at purportedly positive academic theories that fail to attend
sufficiently to how people actually behave. He also believed with quiet passion that the ultimate test of normative legal theories should lie in whether, if
implemented, they would produce better results than current regimes—not
under imagined ideal conditions, but in actual practice.
Although Dan’s practical orientation made him wary of abstract methodological argumentation, he took up the cudgels of theoretical debate to
defend his views about statutory interpretation. Characteristically, Dan
expressed his views in articles of carefully limited scope. Some of his broader
pronouncements came in a piece that he and I co-authored entitled Federal
Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror.1 In it, we
© 2016 Richard H. Fallon, Jr. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame
Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Story Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Dan Meltzer was my cherished friend
and closest professional colleague and collaborator for thirty-three years. He was also as
thoroughly admirable a human being as I have ever known. I have paid tribute to his
character, and celebrated the stunning range of his personal and professional
contributions, elsewhere. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., In Memoriam: Daniel J. Meltzer, 129
HARV. L. REV. 400 (2015). In this Essay for this Symposium, I therefore limit my tribute to
his scholarship, but with emphasis that a full celebration of his life would encompass
much, much more. In preparing this Essay, I have benefited greatly from comments by
Scott Dodson, Vicki Jackson, John Manning, Henry Monaghan, Judith Resnik, and David
Shapiro and from excellent research assistance by Ephraim McDowell.
1 Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive
Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029 (2007).
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argued that the Supreme Court has appropriately adapted its interpretation
of longstanding jurisdictional statutes in light of evolving understandings of
the scope, and especially the geographic reach, of substantive constitutional
rights.2 Using the habeas corpus statutes as an illustration, our article
defended a “common law model” in which courts play the role of “junior
partners”3 of Congress in interpreting statutory language to operate sensibly
and justly in circumstances that its authors and legislative supporters likely
did not foresee.4 With history largely on our side,5 Dan joined me in wanting
courts to continue an approach that we thought had long worked well, albeit
of course not perfectly, in practice.6
Our arguments concerning interpretive methodology in Federal Habeas
Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror substantially echoed
Dan’s considered views as expressed elsewhere. Five years earlier, in The
Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity,7 Dan had criticized a set of cases in which the
Court “sound[ed] the theme that . . . Congress has primary, if not exclusive,
2 Id. at 2033.
3 Id. at 2041.
4 See id. at 2033 (“[T]he Common Law Model views courts as having a creative, discretionary function in adapting constitutional and statutory language—which is frequently
vague, and even more frequently reflects imperfect foresight—to novel circumstances.”).
Especially in describing our preferred methodology as involving a “Common Law Model,”
our article substantially accorded in its central themes and analysis with—but did not cite
or discuss—a marvelous essay by Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U.
COLO. L. REV. 225 (1999). In that essay, Professor Strauss describes our legal system as
incorporating and requiring for its successful functioning a set of assumptions about the
judicial role in relation to the legislative role that grow out of our common law heritage.
On the legislative side, Strauss notes that statutes are seldom comprehensive or code-like,
that they are often inartfully drafted due to peculiarities of the American legislative process, and that they perhaps typically are enacted to correct perceived deficiencies in a prior
legal framework that they otherwise leave largely intact. On the judicial side, Professor
Strauss emphasizes the role of stare decisis in clarifying and sometimes changing the meaning of statutes, with the effect, he argues, that the body of law of which statutes form a part
is a joint legislative and judicial product, even in areas in which Congress has legislated
actively. Although Strauss describes the role of courts in relation to Congress as that of
“partners,” not “junior partners,” I do not understand that difference of terminology to
signal a difference of substance concerning the appropriate judicial role, as Professor
Strauss makes clear that Congress always “has the larger claim for respect for its judgments.” Id. at 252. Dan cited The Common Law and Statutes approvingly, but in support of
relatively narrow points, in Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP.
CT. REV. 343, 380 n.151, 385 n.166. In this Essay, I take no position about whether Professor Strauss’s broadest claims about the origins and foundations of the federal judiciary’s
common-law-like role are correct or about whether Dan would have agreed with them in
all of their particulars, despite a very large overlap of prescriptive conclusions.
5 See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 1, at 2042.
6 See id. at 2044 (“[A] common law approach to habeas corpus issues has been not
only historically dominant, but also, for the most part, historically successful.”); Meltzer,
supra note 4, at 389 (citing “a conservative argument, in the sense of Burkean conservatism, against judicial passivity,” since “it constitutes a significant departure from historic
norms”).
7 Meltzer, supra note 4.
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responsibility for fleshing out the operation of schemes of federal regulation.”8 If followed consistently, he argued, the approach of those cases
“would deprive the polity of an immeasurably important source of lawmaking
authority [that courts have traditionally exercised], would impose unrealistic
demands on the federal legislative process, and would give rise to needless
injustices in routine disputes.”9 In Dan’s last published article, Preemption
and Textualism,10 he examined the specific challenges that courts confront in
preemption cases, in which one party argues that a federal regulatory statute,
although without saying so expressly, has impliedly preempted or nullified
otherwise applicable state regulatory requirements. In this piece, Dan
defended “purposive” statutory interpretation, in which courts ask whether
the continued enforcement of state regulations would substantially impede
the realization of federal statutes’ purposes.11 He regarded purpose-based
interpretation as necessary to “the task of fashioning a workable legal system,” especially but not exclusively in preemption disputes.12
Dan’s opponents in debates about statutory interpretations were “textualists,” formalists, and proponents of an “agency model” who maintain—
often for theoretical reasons—that courts should understand their role in
interpreting statutes as that of the legislature’s “faithful agents” in a narrow
sense of that term. On this view, courts typically should adhere closely to the
language that Congress has chosen, and they should hesitate to ascribe purposes to the legislature beyond those minimally necessary to render its choice
of language intelligible.13 Adherents of the approaches with which Dan took
issue would acknowledge that Congress’s chosen language can sometimes
require courts to exercise independent judgment.14 If, for example, a statute
makes it unlawful to drive at an “unreasonable” rate of speed, courts will
need to decide what is unreasonable under particular circumstances. The
nub of disagreement between Dan and his textualist adversaries involved
8 Id. at 343.
9 Id. at 345.
10 Daniel J. Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2013).
11 Id. at 57.
12 Id. at 7.
13 See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 1, at 2033 (“According to the Agency Model, courts
should regard themselves as the agents of those who enacted, or ratified, pertinent statutory or constitutional provisions; they should assume that those provisions were framed to
be as determinate as possible; and they should minimize judicial creativity. The Agency
Model seeks to restrict courts to applying the law, not making it.”). Dan characterized his
article Preemption and Textualism, supra note 10, as “in part, . . . a case study of the feasibility
of textualism,” id. at 4, and concluded that textualism was inadequate, see id. at 56 (“Preemption cases highlight vividly the limits of textualism and the limited capacity of the
legislature to prescribe, ex ante, a specific and comprehensive set of statutory directives
that promise to provide a sensible, textually derivable set of outcomes to preemption
decisions.”).
14 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544 (1983)
(“The statute books are full of laws . . . that effectively authorize courts to create new lines
of common law.”); John F. Manning, Response, Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpretation from
the Constitution, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1648, 1655 (2001).
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what he called “the enduring importance . . . of purposive interpretation by
an engaged judiciary.”15 Although the difference can sometimes reduce to
one of mood or degree—as I shall explain below—textualists maintain that if
a statute’s language, as it would have been understood by a reasonable person at the time of its enactment, most naturally appears either to apply or not
to apply to the facts of a case, then courts, as faithful agents, should execute
their instructions as written, without inquiring deeply into the purposes that
the language was meant to serve.16 On this view, moreover, courts should
not assume that Congress would have wanted to accord them interpretive
discretion or to invite their exercise of practical judgment in light of their
appraisal of statutory goals.17
In contrast, Dan maintained that courts should interpret statutory language on the assumption that Congress would have meant to enlist the judiciary as junior partners in developing a just and workable body of law.18 In his
view, courts were “junior” partners rather than Congress’s co-equals in statutory interpretation cases because Congress’s language and policy aims (as
reconstructed by the judiciary) establish the outer limit of the judicial function. The judicial role is to interpret and implement the language that Congress has adopted, not to formulate a policy agenda. Indeed, there is even a
sense in which courts are appropriately characterized as the faithful agents of
Congress: they must enforce decisions that Congress has genuinely made.19
Nevertheless, the characterization of courts as junior partners rather than
mere agents implies that they should regard themselves as trusted rather
than distrusted agents, with some latitude to look beyond the letter of statutory language, especially when confronting cases of a kind that Congress
15 Meltzer, supra note 10, at 57.
16 See Easterbrook, supra note 14, at 544 (“My suggestion is that unless the statute
plainly hands courts the power to create and revise a form of common law, the domain of
the statute should be restricted to cases anticipated by its framers and expressly resolved in
the legislative process.”).
17 See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 1, at 2033 (“According to the Agency Model, courts
should . . . assume that [statutory] provisions were framed to be as determinate as possible;
and they should minimize judicial creativity.”).
18 See id. at 2041.
19 In this sense, I believe that Dan’s understanding of “the Common Law Model” had
more in common with the “purposivist” approach of the Legal Process school than with
what the most recent edition of the Hart & Wechsler casebook calls “common law theories
of statutory interpretation” that, it says, reject “the assumption that federal judges must act
as Congress’ faithful agents, whose duty is to ascertain and enforce legislative commands
with accuracy.” RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L.
SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 655–56 (7th
ed. 2015) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]. Although the difference can be a subtle one, I
do not believe that Dan questioned the courts’ obligation to “enforce legislative commands” in cases in which, as properly interpreted, they applied. For a discussion of the
relationship of contemporary federal courts scholarship—including Dan’s as well as my
own—to “the Legal Process paradigm,” see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and
Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 953 (1994).
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likely did not foresee at the time of a statute’s enactment.20 In such cases,
courts should regard themselves as entrusted to assume—absent evidence to
the contrary—that Congress would have intended statutory language to be
interpreted and applied in light of good sense, pertinent constitutional values, reason, and experience. These, I acknowledge, are vague and controversial terms. Wisely, Dan sought to elucidate the limits of judicial power in
interpreting federal statutes more by example than by articulation of brightline rules.
As textualism and the faithful-agency view have emerged in judicial opinions and the surrounding literature, they reflect the conjunction of several
premises.21 First, the separation of powers and democratic theory demand
that the courts’ lawmaking role should be subordinated as much as possible
to that of the legislature.22 Second, the legislature of which courts are the
agents is “a ‘they,’ not an ‘it,’”23 who frequently struggle to find compromises, often including unprincipled compromises, that can command the
allegiance of a majority.24 It is, accordingly, a mistake to view legislation, or
to interpret it as if it should be viewed, as the effort of a rationally united
majority to achieve a coherent, reasonable purpose or set of purposes that
courts should seek to advance. To the contrary, laws are better viewed as
deals among often antagonistic legislative factions.25 Third, the language of
a statute represents the singularly authoritative embodiment of the deal that
Congress struck.26 Accordingly, courts should interpret legislation to pre20 See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 1, at 2041 (“Under the Common Law Model, courts
remain agents, but agents with more leeway. The model’s underlying assumption is that
those who adopted open-ended constitutional or statutory provisions, aware of their limited foresight, would not have wanted to bind the courts or the country too rigidly.”).
21 For a brisk summary of the tenets of “the new textualism,” see HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 19, at 654–55.
22 See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2505 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(deriding an interpretive philosophy that “ignores the American people’s decision to give
Congress ‘[a]ll legislative Powers’ enumerated in the Constitution” under which “Congress,
not this Court, [is] responsible for both making laws and mending them”); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 70–78 (2001).
23 Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 244 (1992). Echoing this formulation, textualists emphasize
that legislatures are multimember bodies lacking shared psychological intentions. See, e.g.,
John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 428–31 (2005).
24 See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 14, at 540 (“Almost all statutes are compromises,
and the cornerstone of many a compromise is the decision, usually unexpressed, to leave
certain issues unresolved. Whether these issues have been identified (so that the lack of
their resolution might be called intentional) or overlooked (so that the lack of their resolution is of ambiguous portent) is unimportant.”); John F. Manning, Foreword: The Means of
Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1, 30 (2014) (“The Court’s present textualist presumption—that Congress means what it says—gives Congress more reliable tools than
before to exercise its acknowledged powers to enact the messy, incoherent, overbroad,
incomplete, or buck-passing legislation that the Necessary and Proper Clause entitles it to
enact.”).
25 See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 14, at 547; Manning, supra note 23, at 428–31.
26 See, e.g., Manning, supra note 22, at 18.
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serve the bargain that its language most plausibly reveals, even when the
results in a particular case seem highly regrettable. In advocating this
approach, proponents sometimes add, as a fourth argument, that it would
help to empower Congress to craft the deals it wants by giving assurance that
courts will apply statutory language as written.27
On the surface, Dan’s arguments against textualism and narrow versions
of other faithful-agency theories of statutory interpretation were largely pragmatic.28 He emphasized that Congress writes statutory language with limited
time and foresight.29 Especially when courts confront situations that Congress had almost surely not had in view, Dan thought that textualism would
frequently lead to bad results. He also maintained that his preferred
approach, if correctly practiced, would assist and empower Congress, not
promote judicial usurpation of properly legislative functions.30
In this Essay, written in tribute to Dan, I shall attempt to explicate his
views regarding statutory interpretation in general, thematic terms. In doing
so, I shall register my agreement with virtually all of Dan’s conclusions and
frequently echo his practically minded arguments in support of them. But I
shall also advance arguments—with which I cannot be entirely sure he would
have agreed—that seek to show that his position reflected theoretical insights
about how language works, not only in law, but also more generally in life.
By seeking simultaneously to defend Dan’s views and to build on them,
this Essay may sometimes blur the line between explication and original argumentation. Its methodology is, accordingly, risky, but I do not believe it is
misplaced. As I hope will become clear, my blending of descriptive and interpretive claims with normative argumentation in some ways parallels the
approach that Dan thought courts should take in acting as Congress’s junior
partners.

27 See, e.g., Manning, supra note 24, at 25–26.
28 See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 4, at 383 (“The question of the proper interpretation of
statutes and the proper role of federal common lawmaking is ultimately a question of political and constitutional theory, but . . . that normative question cannot be intelligently
addressed without considerable attention to matters that are far more empirical and
pragmatic.”).
29 Id. at 384–85 (“[T]he American system of lawmaking . . . lacks the party discipline
and executive control of the legislature that characterizes parliamentary systems. The latter are, accordingly, more conducive to the enactment of comprehensive statutes that
reflect a coherent, integrated viewpoint and that can be rapidly amended if gaps or
problems are revealed. In our system, the Executive Branch, though it helps to shape
legislation, does not control its course as do executive ministries in many parliamentary
systems. And within the Congress, party cohesion is often absent and agreement between
House and Senate must be reached, leading inevitably to compromises and eleventh-hour
revisions. Finally, American legislative drafting is less professional and centralized than
that in a number of other countries. For all of these reasons, federal legislation is likely to
be partial, unintegrated, reactive, and lacking in coherence.” (footnotes omitted)).
30 See generally Meltzer, supra note 4.
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I. THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COURTS’
JUNIOR PARTNERSHIP ROLE
Dan’s views about statutory interpretation were boldly normative in
some respects. In others, they relied on a descriptive account of historical
judicial practice.31 In later parts of this Essay, I shall ally myself with most, if
not all, of Dan’s normative claims. In this Part, I undertake to occupy an
analytical space that lies between, though it blends into, both the narrowly
descriptive and the purely normative. More specifically, I hope to show that
for courts to play a discretionary, policymaking role—or what Dan called that
of a junior partner—is inescapable in light of irreducible features of law and
language.
Much of what I say in this Part may seem banal. Nevertheless, the ensuing analysis is important for two related reasons. First, my claims about what
courts inescapably must do will provide a foundation for later, more controversial arguments about how courts should discharge their functions as Congress’s junior, lawmaking partners. Second, as I shall point out later, the
analysis in this Part refutes premises on which textualists sometimes rely in
objecting to more normatively controversial claims.
A.

The Inescapable Significance of the Intent of the Legislature

In the literature on statutory interpretation, the leading debates concern
whether courts should look at legislative history32 and, as it is often put,
whether courts can use legislative history or imputed statutory purposes to
“contradict” a clear statutory text.33 But it is impossible to engage in the
latter debate, in particular, without examining what it means for a text to be
clear in its application to a case’s facts.
31 See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 1, at 2044 (noting that a common law approach to
statutory interpretation “has been . . . historically dominant” and embracing “the bounds
established by the norms of interpretive practice that constitute the Common Law
Model”); Daniel J. Meltzer, Jurisdiction and Discretion Revisited, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1891, 1893 (2004) (“‘Is’ may not be ‘ought,’ but claims that judicial practices are politically
illegitimate are far more difficult to sustain when those practices are widespread and longstanding and when there is a pattern not of congressional opposition but, instead, of
apparent congressional acquiescence.”).
32 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 COLUM. L.
REV. 531, 532 (2013) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012)) (noting that “the big debate” about the proper
definition of the “interpretive context” for interpreting statutes involves the propriety of
reliance on legislative history).
33 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 32, at 56–57 (discussing the “Supremacy-of-Text
Principle”: “except in the rare case of an obvious scrivener’s error, purpose—even purpose
as most narrowly defined—cannot be used to contradict text or to supplement it”); John F.
Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2434 n.179 (2003) (“[T]he modern textualists’ concerns come into play only when courts use background statutory purpose to contradict or vary the clear meaning of a specific statutory provision.” (emphasis
omitted)).
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In order to apply statutes, courts obviously need to ascertain their meanings or, as some would say, their “communicative content.”34 Moreover,
although some appeals to legislative intent engender controversy, all should
acknowledge that the identification of a statute’s meaning requires an ascription of communicative intentions. Statutes are not mere words on a page
with unknown authors and mysterious origins.35 To the contrary, we think
statutes worth interpreting, and deserving of application, only because they
reflect the intention of a legislature, by making a law, to direct behavior or
authoritatively stipulate what the consequences of behavior will be.
Nevertheless, when we think about courts ascribing communicative
intentions to the legislature, we plunge almost immediately into theoretically
puzzling territory.36 Textualists like to say that the legislature “is a ‘they,’ not
an ‘it.’”37 This observation is undoubtedly true and important for many purposes. We should not forget it. But all members of the legislature, or at least
all who vote for a bill, must have a minimal collective intention to enact a law
and, by doing so, to communicate commands, stipulations, or information
with the aim of affecting human behavior.38
The most promising explanatory approach to this hypothesized phenomenon of collective legislative communication seems to me to lie in
attempts by philosophers to explain collective, group, or what I shall refer to
as “we-intentions.”39 Roughly described, these are the individual intentions
of multiple people to do something together—which, in familiar illustrations, might include taking a walk together or cooking dinner together—so
that each of them can say “I intend that we” do something collectively or
jointly. My intention that my wife and I should cook dinner together is different from my mere intention to cook dinner and her separate intention to
cook dinner.
To begin to give content to the idea of we-intentions with respect to
legislation, we might say that each member of the legislature who votes for a
measure (a) intends that the legislature should enact it as law and (b) further
intends to communicate whatever a reasonable member of the target audi34 See Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 479, 484 (2013).
35 See Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re Speaking?” Why
Intention Free Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967, 969 (2004) (“[O]ne
cannot interpret texts without reference to the intentions of some author. Indeed, texts
can only be identified as texts by reference to authorial intent.”).
36 For a lucid discussion of surrounding legal and philosophical debates, see generally
RICHARD EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT (2012).
37 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
38 See Manning, supra note 23, at 432–33 (“[T]he demands of legislative supremacy
require only that legislators intend to enact a law that will be decoded according to prevailing interpretive conventions. If so, then society can at least attribute to each legislator the
intention ‘to say what one would ordinarily be understood as saying, given the circumstances in which one said it.’” (quoting Joseph Raz, Intention in Interpretation, in THE
AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LEGAL POSITIVISM 249, 268 (Robert P. George ed., 1996))).
39 See, e.g., EKINS, supra note 36, at 218–43.
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ence would understand the law as communicating. This account depicts the
challenge of statutory interpretation as beginning with an ascription of communicative intentions to the legislature. It also leads to an account of a statute’s meaning or communicative content that roughly tracks the formulation
offered by the best-known philosopher of language who has so far engaged
deeply with issues of legal interpretation:
In general, what a speaker uses a sentence S to assert or stipulate in a given
context is, to a fair approximation, what a reasonable hearer or reader who
knows the linguistic meaning of S, and is aware of all relevant intersubjectively available features of the context of the utterance, would rationally take
the speaker’s use of S to be intended to convey and commit the speaker
to.40

As applied to issues of legal interpretation, this characterization situates
courts in the role of a reasonable listener or hearer. Thus far, this focus
accords with the views of most textualists, who emphasize that statutory interpretation depends on what a reasonable person would understand statutory
language to mean or convey, in context.41 Accepting that account for present purposes, I mean only to insist that a reasonable reader or hearer will
frequently if not invariably discern the meaning of legislation by making
rough-and-ready ascriptions of policy goals to the legislature, whether selfconsciously or not. As Justice Scalia wrote, the word “nails” means one thing
when it appears in a building code, but something different in a statute regulating beauty salons.42 To know what the word means in context, we need to
know, or reach judgments concerning, the goals that the legislature sought
to achieve.
A so-called plain meaning school of statutory interpretation once
rejected, or at least sometimes appeared to reject, these insights.43 Today,
however, nearly all participants in debates about statutory interpretation
agree that meaning depends on context.44 Moreover, although textualists
seek to prioritize the understandings of a reasonable listener or hearer over
40 Scott Soames, Deferentialism: A Post-Originalist Theory of Legal Interpretation, 82 FORDL. REV. 597, 598 (2013).
41 See, e.g., John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 70, 91 (2006) (noting that textualists determine statutory meaning based on “evidence about the way a reasonable person conversant with relevant social and linguistic
practices would have used the words”); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 33, at 16 (“In
their full context, words mean what they conveyed to reasonable people at the time they
were written . . . .”).
42 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 33, at 20.
43 For discussion of the “plain meaning” approach to statutory interpretation, see, for
example, Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain
Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231.
44 See, e.g., Manning, supra note 33, at 2456 (“In contrast with their literalist predecessors in the ‘plain meaning’ school, modern textualists reject the idea that interpretation
can occur ‘within the four corners’ of a statute.” (quoting White v. United States, 191 U.S.
545, 551 (1903))); Manning, supra note 41, at 73, 79–80 (discussing the centrality of
notions of context to rival purposivist and textualist theories alike).
HAM
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the intentions of the legislature, a context necessarily comprises a speaker as
well as a listener. And in the context of legislation, the speaker—or at least
the closest analogue—is a legislature with policy aims or intentions. So conceding, even textualists acknowledge that their approach needs to rely on or
presuppose what they sometimes call an “objective” legislative intent.45
In my view, the idea of an “objective” legislative intent can prove mysterious, even if one thinks it inescapable. Recognizing that textualists often
invoke it in opposition to the “subjective” intent that they think some nontextualists look to legislative history to identify, we may make some progress
by postulating that the objective intent is that of an imagined, hypothetical,
possibly typical or reasonable legislature, abstracted from the known or possible vagaries of the members of the actual legislature who drafted, negotiated,
and enacted a statute.46 Crucially, however, legislative intent in this objective
sense cannot be separated from imagined or imputed purposes. For example, we know that a reference to “nails” in a building code refers to something different from the word “nails” in a statute regulating beauty parlors
because we impute a legislative intention or purpose of regulating the construction of buildings in one case and the provision of beauty-related products and services in the other.47
With the exclusion of imputed purposes being admittedly impossible,
textualists nevertheless demand limitations that they insist are more stringent
than interpretive purposivists recognize. As a first approximation, we might
therefore assume that textualist strictures proscribe courts from going any
further than necessary in ascribing goals, purposes, or intentions to the legislature: the legislature’s objective intent reflects and derives from the sparest
set of policy aims that needs to be ascribed to the legislature to make sense of
a statute’s language. In particular, courts should not ascribe purposes to the
legislature at a level of generality that would tempt or authorize them to deviate from the otherwise clear import of a statute’s language.48 As textualists
rightly emphasize, legislatures make choices of means as well as ends.49 A
statute that sets speed limits seeks to promote highway safety, but only
45 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION
3, 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (“We look for a sort of ‘objectified’ intent—the intent that
a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder
of the corpus juris.”); Manning, supra note 23, at 423 (“[T]extualists have sought to devise a
constructive intent that satisfies the minimum conditions for meaningfully tracing statutory
meaning to the legislative process.”); Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347,
353–57 (2005) (discussing textualists’ search for statutes’ “objectified intent”).
46 Cf. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Speech, Death, and Double Effect, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1135,
1155 (2003) (employing an “objective notion of intention as it is made manifest through
the performance of actions of a certain type, actions that, because of what they involve, are
typically motivated by a certain rationale and are reasonably interpreted as being so
motivated”).
47 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
48 See, e.g., Manning, supra note 24, at 25–26.
49 See, e.g., id.
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through the means of regulating speed. It does not prohibit, or authorize a
court to punish, a broader gamut of unsafe driving practices. Accordingly,
textualists insist, courts should not rely on their judgments concerning what
the realization of a statute’s purposes would require to override language
that limits the means through which Congress decided to pursue its goals.50
B.

Some Complexities of Context

Although these cautions from textualists are often valuable, the idea of
“context”—on which all agree that statutory meaning depends51—introduces
a large complication. As invoked in debates about statutory interpretation, a
context embraces not only a speaker and readers or listeners, but also shared
background understandings among speakers and listeners that make it possible for some things to go without saying.52 To develop this point, let me
begin with some examples not from law, but from ordinary, non-legal
conversation.53
A vivid illustration comes from sarcasm. “Sam was a big help” can mean
either that Sam was a big help or, in context, the opposite, that Sam was no
help at all. The meaning of the utterance depends in large part on background understandings shared by the speaker and his or her listeners. To
take another example, an emergency ward doctor who assures her patient
“you are not going to die” does not offer a prediction that the patient will live
forever—even though that is the literal meaning of the words that she
utters.54 In light of what we know or think we know about emergency ward
doctors and their patients, we conclude confidently that “you are not going
to die” constitutes a short-term prognosis. Significantly, however, the same
string of words might have a quite different meaning if uttered, in the same
hospital, by a Roman Catholic clergyman administering last rites to a terminal patient. In this case, a reasonable listener would indeed understand the
speaker as offering an assurance of eternal life, though possibly of an extratemporal character. Once again, shared background assumptions that both
50 See id.
51 See Manning, supra note 41, at 73, 79–80 (discussing the importance of context for
both textualist and purposivist approaches to statutory interpretation).
52 The classic text explaining these shared background understandings is PAUL GRICE,
STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS (1989).
53 For discussion of the role of presuppositions in linguistic communication, see, for
example, SCOTT SOAMES, 1 PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS: NATURAL LANGUAGE: WHAT IT MEANS
AND HOW WE USE IT 3–130 (2008), and Robert Stalnaker, Common Ground, 25 LINGUISTICS
& PHIL. 701, 701 (2002). Presuppositions can be distinguished in various ways. For example, Soames distinguishes among logical, expressive, and pragmatic presuppositions. See
SOAMES, supra, at 75–76. Robyn Carston, Legal Texts and Canons of Construction: A View from
Current Pragmatic Theory, in 15 LAW AND LANGUAGE: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 8, 9 (Michael
Freeman & Fiona Smith eds., 2013), differentiates pragmatic from semantic
presuppositions.
54 See, e.g., Andrei Marmor, The Pragmatics of Legal Language, 21 RATIO JURIS 423, 426
(2008).
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speaker and listener would understand as going without saying determine
what the utterance means.
We might think that examples such as these—involving situations in
which background understandings that can go without saying determine the
meaning of utterances—have few if any analogues in law. Not so. The
assumptions that disambiguate the reference to nails in a building code may
well go without saying. When Article II of the Constitution provides that only
“natural born Citizen[s]”55 can serve as President, we know that it refers to
people who were born in the United States or were citizens from birth and
does not exclude citizens whose mothers gave birth by cesarean section.56 In
this case, once more, our confident judgment reflects assumptions and goals
that we ascribe to the authors and ratifiers of the constitutional phrase. As
Justice Scalia wrote, many of the canons of interpretation attempt to memorialize linguistic and culturally based assumptions that otherwise could go without saying.57 If the law says that children over the age of six must attend
school, it goes without saying that children under six need not. In explaining
this conclusion, we might cite the interpretive canon that says “expressio unius
est exclusio alterius,”58 but we would reach the same judgment if the provision
appeared in the laws of a state that has precluded judicial reliance on the
canons as sources of statutory meaning.59
As these examples suggest, the ascription of purposes to the legislature
in light of what are taken to be shared background assumptions occurs ubiquitously in the law, most often unselfconsciously. An increasingly hackneyed
but nevertheless useful example comes from Smith v. United States,60 which
involved a statute enhancing the penalty for drug offenses in which the
defendant “use[s]” a firearm.61 The question involved the statute’s application or non-application to a defendant who had traded a gun for drugs.62
Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor concluded that trading a gun constitutes “using” it and that the statute therefore applied.63 Dissenting, Justice
Scalia thought that a reasonable person would understand the statute as
applying only to defendants who used firearms as weapons.64 As between the
majority and the dissent, the issue involved the purpose or intent that should
55 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
56 Although there are debates about whether the relevant language requires birth in
the United States or whether birth to a citizen parent abroad suffices, see infra note 86 and
accompanying text, there is no serious argument that a person born by cesarean section
would be ineligible for the presidency for that reason alone.
57 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 33, at 51.
58 See id. at 107.
59 A number of states have in fact barred reliance on some of the canons. See Abbe R.
Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New
Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1824–29 (2010).
60 508 U.S. 223 (1993).
61 Id. at 227.
62 Id. at 228.
63 Id. at 230.
64 Id. at 241–42 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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be imputed to Congress, and thus the meaning that should be ascribed to the
statute, in light of background assumptions that both took to be obvious,
widely shared, or most reasonably imputed. Justice O’Connor sought directly
to ascertain what the legislature intended. For Justice Scalia, the legislature’s
assumptions and intentions played a less direct but no less important role.
Although he focused his inquiry on the perspective of a reasonable reader or
listener, Justice Scalia’s analysis ultimately involved the purpose that a reasonable listener would have understood the statute to have: Would a reasonable
person have understood Congress as intending to prescribe an enhanced
penalty not only for someone who brandishes a gun coercively, but also for
someone who trades a gun for drugs?
Smith, like most disputed statutory interpretation cases, illustrates the
blurred line between law-applying and law-making in cases in which there is
reasonable disagreement about the intentions that should be imputed to the
legislature in light of further, reasonable disagreement about the background assumptions under which a reasonable reader or listener would identify statutes’ meanings. On the law-making view, the statute is relevantly
vague or ambiguous insofar as uncertainty or disagreement is reasonably possible, and courts need to make law that clarifies what the legislature left indeterminate in order to decide a disputed case. On the law-applying view,
courts make interpretive judgments in ascribing communicative intentions
and statutory purposes in light of the background assumptions that are most
reasonably postulated. Even on the law-applying view, however, courts, in
determining what statutes mean or whether they apply, need to make judgments that go beyond the bare determination of linguistic facts involving the
definitions of words and the rules of grammar and syntax. In doing so, they
need to act as junior partners of the legislature in the sense in which Dan
Meltzer and I have wanted to use that term: they have to impute either sparer
or further reaching regulatory purposes to Congress and resolve cases in
light of those ascribed purposes. Doing so requires judgment and sometimes
creativity in identifying the purposes that are most reasonably ascribed to
Congress in a particular statutory context.65
In many contexts, I want to emphasize, judgments of reasonableness—or
of what a reasonable person would have intended or understood—are not
purely descriptive. As a purely descriptive matter, people not only can, but
sometimes do, disagree about what language means in context. In a case
such as Smith, we might thus say with descriptive accuracy that the statute was
vague or ambiguous and, so saying, might insist that, insofar as description
alone is concerned, there is no more to be said. But the law cannot stop
there. When the law invokes the notion of reasonable speakers and listeners
to resolve issues about which reasonable people actually differ, it invites or
requires conclusions about what would be most reasonable, from a normative

65 Cf. Meltzer, supra note 10, at 57 (asserting the “importance” and “inevitability” of
“purposive interpretation”).
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as well as a descriptive perspective, in light of all relevant circumstances.66 In
other words, the “reasonable” speakers and listeners on whom the law relies
sometimes need to make normative judgments in order to achieve the determinate conclusions that the law relies on them to provide.
C.

The Generative Force of Seemingly Banal Conclusions

In my view, the conclusion that courts must make judgments about
which prescriptive intentions or purposes to ascribe to Congress in order to
interpret statutes—even if the imputed intentions are characterized as objective and are identified without reference to legislative history—is an important one, for a reason that I laid out at the beginning of this Part. Although I
have not, so far, said anything with which a textualist would necessarily disagree, I believe that I have established the theoretical foundations for further
claims that would otherwise occasion significant controversy. To illustrate
that point, recall textualists’ familiar refrain that courts must never rely on
what they take to be statutes’ purposes in order to “contradict” the statutes’
clear textual meanings.67 In light of the analysis that I have just developed,
this statement is either confused or vacuous. Insofar as it assumes that statutes have clear textual meanings that are identifiable independently of a
judgment concerning Congress’s intentions or purposes in enacting them,
the statement is confused. Meaning depends on context. And context
includes background presuppositions in light of which a reasonable listener
or reader would determine whether Congress, as a speaker, intended a statute’s semantic or literal meaning to be its actual meaning in the circumstances of its utterance. Any appeal to a statute’s textual meaning to
disqualify an effort to identify what it actually means in context—in light of
background assumptions that bear on the intentions most plausibly and relevantly ascribed to Congress—is therefore fallacious.
Some textualists so recognize at least some of the time, as three brief
examples may illustrate. First, when Congress assigns jurisdiction to the federal courts, the Supreme Court ordinarily construes the language through
which it does so as mandatory.68 Traditionally, however, courts have had discretion to decline to exercise equity jurisdiction.69 Against that historical
background, the Supreme Court has held repeatedly—with textualists agree66 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Three Symmetries Between Textualist and Purposivist Theories of
Statutory Interpretation—and the Irreducible Roles of Value and Judgment Within Both, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 685, 710–15 (2014).
67 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
68 See, e.g., Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 591 (2013) (affirming that
“a federal court’s ‘obligation’ to hear and decide a case [within its jurisdiction] is ‘virtually
unflagging’” (quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
817 (1976))).
69 See generally David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543,
548–50 (1985) (tracing the longstanding practice of acknowledging judicial discretion to
decline to exercise statutorily authorized jurisdiction, including but not limited to equity
jurisdiction).
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ing in the reasoning—that statutes conferring federal equity jurisdiction
retain the courts’ traditional equitable discretion, even when they say nothing on their faces to indicate that the discretion they confer is other than
mandatory.70
Second, Judge Frank Easterbrook, who ranks among the foremost
defenders of textualism, has argued that courts, for similar reasons, should
read criminal statutes as implicitly incorporating historically recognized
defenses:
For thousands of years, and in many jurisdictions, criminal statutes have
been understood to operate only when the acts were unjustified. The agent
who kills a would-be assassin of the Chief Executive is justified, though the
killing be willful; so too with the person who kills to save his own life. . . .
The process [by which courts interpret statutes in light of historical context]
is cooperative: norms of interpretation and defense, like agreement on
grammar and diction, make it easier to legislate at the same time as they
promote the statutory aim of saving life.71

Third, in addressing the meaning of a preemption clause in the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act that preempts state laws “insofar
as they . . . relate to any employee benefit plan,”72 the Supreme Court—with
its “two keenest textualists, Justices Scalia and Thomas, . . . entirely on
board”73—has unanimously renounced literal interpretation on the ground
that it would sweep unreasonably broadly and has looked instead “to the
objectives of the . . . statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that
Congress understood would survive.”74 As Justice Scalia later put it, “[t]he
statutory text provides an illusory test, unless the Court is willing to decree a
degree of pre-emption that no sensible person could have intended—which
it is not.”75
***
Without offering further examples, I would emphasize three points by
way of conclusion. First, it is a species of confusion—albeit a frequently
asserted one—to say that courts can never legitimately appeal to Congress’s
intentions or purposes to contradict clear or precise statutory language.
Clear meaning, like all meaning, depends on context; and an apparent
70 See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 717 (1996).
71 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Revisited, 112 HARV. L. REV.
1876, 1913–14 (1999). But cf. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S.
483, 490 (2001) (describing as “an open question whether federal courts ever have authority to recognize a necessity defense not provided by statute”).
72 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012).
73 Meltzer, supra note 10, at 21.
74 N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514
U.S. 645, 656 (1995).
75 Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enf’t v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316,
335–36 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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meaning that contradicts widely shared background understandings is not
necessarily clear at all in the absence of a plausible explanatory purpose.
Second, for anyone who accepts them, the examples of judicial interpretation of statutes to reflect the traditions of equity, to contemplate necessity
defenses, and to incorporate common-sense limitations refute the proposition that courts should always ascribe only the sparest set of congressional
intentions or purposes that are necessary to make statutory language minimally coherent. History and common sense often justify the ascription of
much more complex purposes.76
Third, interpreting statutory language in light of purposes that sometimes need to be ascribed to Congress is a core judicial function, even though
the requisite ascriptions require judgments that go beyond the determination of simple matters of historical or linguistic fact. Congress is indeed “a
‘they,’ not an ‘it.’”77 If one thinks again of the Smith case, involving what
“Congress” intended when it provided enhanced penalties for defendants
who used firearms in the course of drug offenses, the answer depends on
what a reasonable person would conclude, not a fact of the matter involving
how many members of Congress thought one thing and how many thought
another. If we were talking about individuals’ subjective intentions in that
way, it would be impossible to combine them into the unitary psychological
intent of a collective legislature. Determining which relevant intentions to
impute to the collective Congress requires judgments of reasonableness with
an irreducible normative component.
II. ROBUST JUNIOR PARTNERSHIP
So far I have laid the conceptual foundations for what Dan Meltzer and I
have called a junior partnership role for the judiciary, but I have not yet
given texture to the terms on which courts should exercise that role. I take
up that challenge with trepidation. A central theme in Dan’s writing
involved the limits of human foresight.78 In theorizing about statutory interpretation and judicial common lawmaking, he embraced the constraints and
obligations that he found implicit in the American legal tradition, but he
emphasized that the tradition includes resources for pragmatically driven
adaptation.79
Without aiming for undue precision, we can further elucidate a common law interpretive approach or a junior partnership model by drawing
three distinctions. The first is between two pictures or models of the way that
language works, one that I call the model of coding and decoding and the
76 For a forceful argument that courts should generally resolve otherwise doubtful
questions “in favor of continuity [with prior law] and against change,” see David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 925 (1992).
77 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
78 See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 10, at 14–17; Meltzer, supra note 4, at 383–90.
79 See, e.g., Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 1, at 2033 (lauding “the courts’ characteristic
approach of interpreting statutory and constitutional provisions as permitting gradual, policy-driven, common law-like adaptation”).
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other the model of creative inference. The second is between foreseen and
unforeseen kinds of cases arising under a statute. The third is between
trusted and distrusted agents.
A.

Alternative Theories of How Linguistic Communication Works

The distinction between a coding and decoding and a creative inference-based model of linguistic communication is admittedly somewhat overdrawn. Nevertheless, it reflects an important difference in interpretative
attitude or perspective.
The model of coding and decoding imagines that natural languages
such as English are in essence codes for the communication of meaning.80
The principal elements of the code are words, the meanings of which dictionaries seek to inscribe. Also vital to the code are rules of syntax that determine how words function in combination to create meaningful sentences. As
applied to law, the code model recognizes that words can have specialized
usages, that context can clarify otherwise ambiguous meanings, and that
speakers and their addressees can both rely on a background set of specifically legal conventions, but one that, according to the textualist theorist John
Manning, should in principle be regarded as a “closed set.”81 According to
the code model, competent users of a language rely on their knowledge of
the meanings of words and the rules of grammar to encode and decode
messages. Crucially, this model assumes that speakers, in choosing their
words, have made considered and determinate decisions about what to
encode. To a reasonable approximation, vague words convey vague meanings, but precise and specific words communicate determinate content.
As compared with the model of coding and decoding, the alternative
model of creative inference is fluid and pragmatic. On this model, speakers
use language as a device to convey meaning to others, and they frequently
rely heavily on dictionary definitions and rules of syntax as part of their effort
to do so. But they also depend on listeners and readers to determine meaning inferentially, based on a large, frequently unspoken body of what one
philosopher of language calls “intersubjectively available features of the context of [an] utterance”82 and what another calls presuppositions or “common
ground.”83
Two illustrations may help to illustrate the application of the model of
creative inference. Suppose that my wife asks me to “bring home a fresh
vegetable” from the supermarket for dinner.84 Without imagining that she
80 See DAN SPERBER & DEIRDRE WILSON, RELEVANCE: COMMUNICATION AND COGNITION
3–9 (1986).
81 Manning, supra note 33, at 2474.
82 Soames, supra note 40, at 598.
83 Stalnaker, supra note 53, at 701.
84 This hypothetical example bears important resemblances to the hypothetical
instruction of a housekeeper to a domestic servant to “fetch some soupmeat” in FRANCIS
LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS, OR PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION IN LAW AND POLITICS 18 (William G. Hammond ed., 3d ed. St. Louis, F.H.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-5\NDL502.txt

1760

unknown

Seq: 18

notre dame law review

29-AUG-16

13:11

[vol. 91:5

has set out to encode much of the information that should inform my action
on her instruction, I know that she would regard tomatoes as a vegetable for
this purpose (even if they could be classified as fruits instead); that she would
not like me to bring home brussels sprouts, which she dislikes; that if we had
had corn from the same supermarket the previous evening and it was not
good, I should not repeat the mistake; and that if there had been no delivery
of fresh produce to the supermarket for several days, and everything looked
desiccated, I would better comply with her wishes if I brought home a frozen
vegetable.
A second, specifically legal illustration of the model of creative inference
involves the constitutional provision—to which I have referred already—
specifying that only natural born citizens are eligible for the presidency.
Although this reference is semantically ambiguous insofar as it might refer
either to (a) those whose mothers did not give birth by cesarean section or
(b) to those who were born in the United States or were citizens from birth,
we resolve this particular ambiguity without difficulty because we take for
granted the existence of linguistic presuppositions or common ground
involving criteria of arguable practical relevance to service as president. We
do so, moreover, even though no one drawing up a list of “conventions” governing proper usage of the English language would plausibly include an item
concerning the disambiguation of the phrase “natural born.”
Now consider two complicating variations on the issues that the Natural
Born Citizen Clause can pose. In 2008, when John McCain ran for president,
a question arose about whether he was ineligible on account of having been
born in the Panama Canal Zone where his father was serving in the U.S.
Navy. Interestingly, nearly all seemed to agree that McCain qualified as a
“natural born citizen.”85 This conclusion obviously rested on imputed linguistic presuppositions about the purposes that these words should be understood to serve in context. By contrast, the scope of the underlying agreement
Thomas & Co. 1880) (1837), reprinted in 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1883, 1904 (1995). For a
lucid and sympathetic modern discussion of Lieber’s hypothetical, see William N. Eskridge,
Jr., “Fetch Some Soupmeat”, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 2209 (1995).
85 See generally Peter J. Spiro, McCain’s Citizenship and Constitutional Method, 107 MICH.
L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 42, 43 (2008) (“A unanimously adopted resolution of the U.S.
Senate, co-sponsored by then-leading Democratic candidates Barack Obama and Hillary
Clinton, declares [McCain] to be natural born. Editorialists of various political stripes support his eligibility. A memo from two leading members of the legal-policy elite, Laurence
Tribe and Theodore Olson—one Democrat, one Republican—reaches the same result.
For all the venom of this presidential contest, there has been little effort by McCain’s opponents—either in the Republican primaries or now in the general election—to press the
case that, if elected, McCain would be constitutionally barred from serving.”). Nevertheless, not everyone accepted this conclusion. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Why Senator John
McCain Cannot Be President: Eleven Months and a Hundred Yards Short of Citizenship, 107 MICH.
L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 1, 1–2 (2008) (“Senator McCain was born in the Canal Zone in
1936. Although he is now a U.S. citizen, the law in effect in 1936 did not grant him citizenship at birth. Because he was not born a citizen, he is not eligible to the office of
president.”).
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about the purposes, meaning, and proper application of the Natural Born
Citizen Clause has been revealed as significantly limited by the case of Ted
Cruz, who was born in Canada to a citizen mother, and thus was a citizen
from birth, but who was not born on a U.S. military base and whose parents
lacked any connection to the U.S. military.86
In my view, any realistic appraisal of the legislative process will acknowledge that statutory language does not always reflect carefully formulated
messages the sensible or intended import of which can be revealed as either
vague or precise through a process that resembles decoding, without resort
to creative inference. As I suggested above, even textualists seem to recognize as much in some cases,87 though they seem to adopt the contrary view in
others, as when they say that courts must not rely on statutory purposes to
contradict clear or specific statutory language.88 I shall offer further examples of cases in which the apprehension of meaning requires creative inference—in law as in other areas of life—below.
B.

Foreseen and Unforeseen Kinds of Cases

Although successful communication often requires creative inference as
much as it does decoding, the implications of this insight for specific legal
issues are, admittedly, often far from obvious. We may gain some grasp of
the challenge that courts confront, however, if we distinguish among some of
the more and less foreseeable kinds of cases to which courts must apply
statutes.
1.

Statutory Examples

A first statutory example, drawn from the heart of the federal courts
field in which Dan principally worked, involves a Reconstruction-era civil
rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which creates a cause of action for damages
and injunctive relief against state officials who violate federal constitutional
or statutory rights.89 Section 1983 initially entered the statute books as part
of the 1871 Ku Klux Klan Act.90 The congressional debates focused heavily
on Klan violence, not constitutional and statutory violations by state officials
86 See, e.g., Thomas Lee, Opinion, Is Ted Cruz a “Natural Born Citizen”? Not if You’re a
Constitutional Originalist, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/oped/la-oe-lee-is-ted-cruz-eligible-to-be-president-20160110-story.html.
87 See supra notes 70–75 and accompanying text.
88 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
89 The text of § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
90 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical
Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 484–85 (1982).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-5\NDL502.txt

1762

unknown

Seq: 20

notre dame law review

29-AUG-16

13:11

[vol. 91:5

unconnected with the Klan.91 In creating a cause of action against state officials for violations of federal law, § 1983 lists no exceptions on its face.
Although strictly literal, exception-less application would be possible—for
example, on the assumption that no dictionary, code, or convention mandates the contrary—it seems highly doubtful that Congress could have foreseen, or meant to authorize or dictate responses to, all of the complexities
that such an interpretation would generate. For instance, in applying the
statute, the Supreme Court has had to decide whether, and if so, when, officials who violate constitutional rights, including judges and prosecutors, can
claim “official immunity” from suits for damages based on analogies to the
immunities that officials enjoyed in suits at common law;92 whether the statutory authorization of injunctive relief overrides pre-existing doctrines that
would have precluded courts of equity from enjoining pending state criminal
prosecutions;93 when, if ever, prior state court decisions bar further litigation
in federal court under doctrines of claim and issue preclusion;94 and
whether the § 1983 cause of action extends to state prisoners who could
instead seek relief through habeas corpus actions.95 In resolving such questions, even committed textualists have concluded that some exceptions to
§ 1983’s literal scope must exist.96
A second kind of example comes from federal regulatory statutes
designed to promote consumer health or safety, such as those that impose
licensing and labeling requirements for federally regulated drugs. Clearly
such statutes establish regulatory floors: drug manufacturers or sellers must
comply with their mandates on pain of whatever penalties the statutes specifically prescribe. But other questions may also arise. Preemption cases, about
which Dan wrote extensively,97 present the question whether statutes that
create federal obligations may, in some circumstances, impliedly preclude
the states from imposing further, typically more onerous duties on federally
regulated parties. If a state purports to establish safety requirements more
91 See id. at 485 (“[T]he entire Act of which section 1983 was a part addressed an
enormously important, but nevertheless limited, problem. Racial attitudes in the South,
blossoming in the form of Klan and other violence, and the failure of the states to cope
with that violence, prompted its enactment.”).
92 For an overview of debates surrounding official immunity doctrine, see HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 19, at 1038–55.
93 For a summary of pertinent doctrine and surrounding debates, see id. at
1094–1127.
94 See id. at 1377–91.
95 See id. at 1391–1404.
96 See Fallon, supra note 66, at 719–24. In doing so, textualist Justices have frequently
but not invariably relied on the common law background against which § 1983 was
enacted. See id. Lacking a common law background on which to rely, in Nat’l Private Truck
Council, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 515 U.S. 582 (1995), the textualist Justice Clarence
Thomas, in a majority opinion joined by Justice Scalia, reasoned that historical practice
supported a “presumption that federal law generally will not interfere with administration
of state taxes” and held on that basis that “Congress did not authorize injunctive or declaratory relief under § 1983 in state tax cases.” Id. at 588.
97 See generally Meltzer, supra note 10; Meltzer, supra note 4, at 362–78.
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stringent than those that Congress has established, the threat of penalties or
liability under state law might push up drug prices or even lead manufacturers to withdraw federally licensed drugs from the market. In cases involving
threats of this kind, the federal courts have considered whether federal statutes impliedly preempt state regulations that would constitute an obstacle to
the achievement of Congress’s regulatory aims98—an approach that Dan
applauded.
2.

Three Categories of Cases

Anticipating that courts will continue to confront questions of statutory
interpretation analogous to those that they have faced in § 1983 and preemption cases, we can usefully consider the issue of limited congressional foresight—as viewed in light of the more general model of the dependence of
successful communication on creative inference—by distinguishing three categories of cases.
The first consists of cases of the kind that Congress clearly had in view
when it enacted a statute and that a reasonable person, aware of all that is
readily publicly known about the problem that Congress sought to address,
would understand the statute as intended to control. The control might take
various forms. Among other possible effects, statutes can authorize action by
public officials, assign consequences to action by private parties, or displace
or preempt legal regulations that otherwise would have applied.
The second category involves kinds of cases that a reasonable person,
familiar with publicly known facts about the context of a statute’s enactment
and all potentially relevant legal, cultural, and linguistic background, would
understand as beyond the statute’s reach.
The third category encompasses kinds of cases that Congress, in light of
the publicly available record, appears not to have had in mind when it
enacted a statute, or could not reasonably have foreseen, but that involve
facts calling for a determination of whether the statute—construed in light of
the purposes most reasonably imputed to Congress—applies. Dan’s writing
about statutory interpretation, which teems with references to unforeseen circumstances and the limited space on Congress’s regulatory agenda, frequently took this kind of case as paradigmatic when arguing that courts
should follow a common law interpretive model or act as Congress’s junior
partners.99 He thought that any decent theory of statutory interpretation
98 See, e.g., Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 64 (2002) (articulating a standard under which federal law will be held impliedly to preempt state law that “stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress” (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941))).
99 See, e.g., Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 1, at 2044 (“As important and unforeseen
issues arise, we think it better for courts to accept responsibility for thinking through the
problems of justice and sound practice that those issues present, within the bounds established by the norms of interpretive practice that constitute the Common Law Model, than
to insist on viewing all of those issues as having been specifically resolved by past
lawmakers.”).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-5\NDL502.txt

1764

unknown

Seq: 22

notre dame law review

29-AUG-16

13:11

[vol. 91:5

should give courts the resources to reach what he took to be practically sensible results in cases of this third, largely unforeseen kind. And he did not
think that courts acted in the teeth of Congress’s code-like instructions in
doing so. To the contrary, a reasonable understanding of how language
works sometimes requires a creative non-literalism in identifying congressional purposes (in light of presuppositions about important, widely shared
values) and an ascription of statutory meaning that reflects those purposes.
The hypothetical case in which my wife asks me to “bring home a fresh vegetable,” as discussed above, illustrates some examples of the need for creative
inference for successful communication to occur in a non-legal context.
Having just sorted statutory interpretation cases into three categories, I
want immediately to acknowledge that any effort to distinguish sharply
between cases that Congress foresaw and those that it did not foresee would
be grossly oversimplified. Everyone agrees that legislation can and must
apply to situations that Congress did not specifically anticipate. In an effort
to alleviate this difficulty (albeit without wholly dispelling it), I have referred
to “kinds of cases” that Congress foresaw or likely would have foreseen, not to
individual cases. We can, I believe, sensibly ask whether a case or kind of case
arising in the post-enactment future, even if it plausibly comes within a statute’s language, exhibits a difference in kind, rather than a mere factual variation, from the paradigmatic instances of application that most members of
Congress would likely have had in mind when they enacted the statute.
Among other, further difficulties, different members of Congress may
well have foreseen or failed to foresee different things. Here we should not
pretend to false precision. The question whether a factual situation deviates
from the kind of case that Congress should be understood as having sought
to control through contested statutory language is ultimately a legal one, not
a pure question of empirical or psychological fact. It involves how a reasonable person would understand Congress’s language in light of the purposes
most reasonably ascribed to Congress, given the language that it used in the
historical, legal, and linguistic context in which it legislated.
In so saying, I might add, once more, that many textualists would not
necessarily object to the conclusion that I have just drawn, though I am quite
sure that some would. If courts must impute an “objective intent” to statutes
in order to interpret them, judgments of reasonableness may enter into the
requisite imputation as an aspect of appraisals of the pertinence of various
elements of legal, cultural, and linguistic background.100 To recur to the
examples that I offered above, Justices of the Supreme Court who generally
embrace textualism have joined in non-literal interpretations of § 1983101
and in conclusions that federal statutes, properly interpreted in the context
of prior preemption jurisprudence, impliedly preempt state regulations.102
100 See Fallon, supra note 66, at 695–96, 719–24.
101 See id. at 719–24.
102 See Meltzer, supra note 10, at 9 (noting “the persistence of implied preemption,
even in the hands of judges who generally share a concern about excessive judicial lawmaking authority and a concomitant attraction to textualism in interpretation”).
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They have also held that federal statutes enacted subsequently to § 1983 that
provide express remedies for violations of their provisions impliedly displace
the cause of action for damages and injunctive relief that otherwise would
exist under § 1983 against state officials who violate federal statutory
rights.103 In imputing an objective intent to Congress to withdraw rights to
sue under § 1983, textualist Justices may reason that providing duplicate remedies would be so improvident that no reasonable Congress could have
intended to do so.
Some textualists, however, believe that their methodology commits them
to more literal interpretations of statutory language. Looking at the
Supreme Court’s § 1983 cases or its preemption jurisprudence, these purer
textualists, as they might style themselves, maintain that the Court had no
justification for deviating from clear statutory language by creating non-textual exceptions or upholding preemption claims under statutes that lacked
express preemption clauses.104 But that response, as we have seen already, is
question-begging insofar as it assumes that a statute’s literal or semantic
meaning is also its clear, actual meaning. In context, a statute’s actual meaning may differ from its literal or semantic meaning.
C.

Trusted and Distrusted Agents

In my arguments so far, I have disparaged the possibility that there could
be useful rules for determining—without the exercise of case-specific judgment—whether, when, or how far courts should construe statutes as going
beyond, or as reaching less far than, the literal or semantic meaning of their
terms. Moreover, Part I specifically resisted any suggestion that courts, in
construing statutes in context, should always ascribe to Congress the sparest,
least complex set of purposes or policy judgments that would make coherent
sense of a statute’s language and thus apply a statute as nearly literally as is
reasonably possible—for example, by insisting that a statute that does not list
any exceptions on its face necessarily contemplates no exceptions.
I want to return to that possible view now because an increasing number
of textualists—though surely not all of them—seem to hold or at least
approximate it.105 One gets a hint of that view in textualist arguments, which
103 See City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 121 (2005) (“The provision
of an express, private means of redress in the statute itself is ordinarily an indication that
Congress did not intend to leave open a more expansive remedy under § 1983.”); see also
Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981) (“When
the remedial devices provided in a particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive, they may
suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under
§ 1983.”).
104 Justice Thomas has registered his skepticism of the Supreme Court’s implied preemption jurisprudence. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 582–604 (2009) (Thomas,
J., concurring in the judgment).
105 See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc., 534 U.S. 438, 460–61 (2002) (“Where the
statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we need neither accept nor reject a particular ‘plausible’ explanation for why Congress would have written a statute [in a particular
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Dan Meltzer specifically rejected in his article Preemption and Textualism,106
that courts should never interpret federal statutes as preempting state law
unless (1) Congress expressly indicated its preemptive intent or (2) compliance with both state and federal law is strictly impossible and federal law thus
necessarily overrides state law under the Supremacy Clause.107
There are multiple grounds on which textualists might support the position that I have just described and multiple grounds on which one might
oppose it. More precisely, there is not just a multitude of available arguments but a multitude of categories of possible arguments on both sides.
These include (a) linguistic arguments about the communicative content of
statutory language,108 (b) legal arguments about the presumptions, if any,
that the Constitution requires or authorizes in ascribing intentions to Congress or otherwise determining the significance of statutory language as a
matter of law,109 and (c) policy arguments about the values that various interpretive approaches would promote or the consequences that they would produce.110 It could perhaps go without saying that these various kinds of
arguments can prove very difficult to disentangle from one another.
Dan’s arguments for adopting a view of the federal courts as trusted
agents, to which I shall come very shortly, were predominantly legal, historical, and policy based. But I want to say a few words first about linguistically
based arguments, partly because I believe that persuasive arguments in that
domain help to license the legal and policy arguments that Dan made so
effectively. The linguistic arguments link directly back to the admittedly
oversimplified distinctions that I have drawn between competing models of
the way in which language functions and between kinds of cases that Congress, in enacting a statute, could reasonably be viewed as either having had
in mind or as unlikely to have anticipated. If we think about whether a reasonable person, occupying the role of a judge, would understand Congress’s
choice of statutory language as having dictated the proper resolution of cases
in the unforeseen category, among the relevant considerations would be this:

way]. . . . Dissatisfied with the text of the statute, the Commissioner attempts to search for
and apply an overarching legislative purpose to each section of the statute. Dissatisfaction,
however, is often the cost of legislative compromise.”); Manning, supra note 33, at 2390
(“Despite the absurdity doctrine’s deep roots, recent intellectual and judicial developments have undermined the doctrine’s strong intentionalist foundations.”); Jonathan R.
Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 117, 121 (2009) (arguing that a “pure” version of textualism would allow “absurd” results).
106 See Meltzer, supra note 10, at 8–34.
107 See, e.g., Note, Preemption as Purposivism’s Last Refuge, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1056,
1064–68 (2013).
108 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for
Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1243–51, 1280–85 (2015); Solum,
supra note 34, at 480–507.
109 See, e.g., Manning, supra note 22, at 27.
110 See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 14, at 549–51; Siegel, supra note 105, at 121.
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Would the reasonable person, now imagined to be a judge, regard herself as
a relatively trusted or a more nearly distrusted agent?111
A principal who distrusts her agent will want the agent to construe her
instructions relatively literally, and an agent who correctly understands her
status will respond accordingly. Correspondingly, a principal who trusts her
agent—for example, regards her as a junior partner in her projects—will
likely intend her agent to construe her instructions as less restrictive of her
judgment, especially in unforeseen circumstances quite different from those
that the principal had in mind when issuing the instruction. And whether an
agent is relatively trusted or more nearly distrusted will often be part of the
set of background assumptions in light of which an utterance by a principal
directed to that agent will draw its meaning “in context.”
I sought to offer a model of a relatively trusted agent when, above, I
imagined a situation in which my wife asks me to “bring home a fresh vegetable” from the supermarket. In offering that instruction, she assumes—even
if she does not pause so to reflect and to encode the information in her
message—that we share a great deal of knowledge, have substantially convergent values, and, as a result, are likely to concur in our judgments of desirable and undesirable outcomes. In interpreting her instruction, I would
therefore conclude that I had far greater scope for the exercise of judgment
or discretion than if, most improbably, a gourmet chef of whose tastes and
plans I knew nothing asked me to stop at the supermarket and purchase a
fresh vegetable on my way to a dinner party. Lacking pertinent information,
and recognizing that a gourmet chef would have no reason to trust my judgment, I would construe my instructions much more literally.
If this analysis is correct, I believe that the lesson applies to cases involving statutory interpretation by the federal courts, at least to this extent: the
appropriate interpretation of statutory language may sometimes depend, in
part, on whether courts should be viewed as relatively trusted or more nearly
distrusted agents of Congress. In so saying, I do not mean to imply that general reflection on the nature of linguistic communication can resolve this
question, only that such reflection can help to frame the question of how
courts should approach their interpretive tasks. As I have said repeatedly,
arguments purporting to resolve debated issues of statutory interpretation by
appeal to purported matters of linguistic fact—as, for example, in claims that
statutes have plain linguistic meanings from which courts must not deviate
based on purported evidence of legislative purpose—are typically confused,
fallacious, or at best incomplete.
Dan’s arguments for the junior partnership model of statutory interpretation wholly avoided such confusions. As a historical matter, Dan argued,
courts had long played the role that he advocated, generally with good
results. Characteristically, he sought to establish that conclusion by citing
111 Dan embraced this framing of the question. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 1, at
2033 (“[Under the Common Law Model,] judges remain agents, but, absent contrary evidence, they assume their principals invested them with bounded authority to interpret
legal mandates in light of considerations of fairness, policy, and prudence.”).
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specific examples in the substantive fields on which his scholarship focused.
In one article, he and I looked at the Supreme Court’s historic approach to
interpreting the statutory grant of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, especially as applied to cases involving federal detainees whose detentions had
not been previously authorized by an Article III court.112
More recently, Dan wrote about preemption. In his article, he emphasized that Congress, when adopting a federal statute for the first time, could
hardly be expected to know of, anticipate, or provide wisely for all possible
interactions between that statute and the laws of all fifty states, some of which
the states might not even have enacted yet.113 And a variety of difficulties,
including shortage of time, preclude Congress from enacting thoughtful corrective legislation whenever it emerges in practice that continued operation
of state law would frustrate manifest federal policy.114 It is, accordingly, practically imperative, he argued, for “courts are to play a large lawmaking role in
preemption cases—one that necessarily involves their exercising judgment
about complicated matters.”115
In addition to the argument that statutory interpretation on a common
law model produced more sensible and just results than the legal system
could likely achieve otherwise, Dan made a subtler point about Congress’s
motivation to enlist the judiciary as junior partners or trusted agents: Congress needs junior partners or trusted agents in order to be able to legislate
effectively.116 It was “implausible,” he wrote, “to expect that Congress can
specify in advance the answer to the complex questions that over time will
arise” in the administration of a complex legislative scheme.117 Under these
circumstances, “judicial passivity” in failing to interpret statutes and craft fed112 See generally id.
113 See Meltzer, supra note 10, at 15–16 (“First, the member of Congress would have to
identify all of the state and local laws in existence in fifty states and countless localities that
might intersect in some significant way with the new federal statutory scheme. . . . (A further difficulty . . . is that many preemption cases involve state or local laws that were
enacted after the effective date of the federal statute claimed to preempt them.). Second,
in order to think intelligently about how far to preempt, the member of Congress often
would have to be able to predict how a new and untested federal statutory regime is going
to operate. That would frequently be inordinately difficult, especially in cases in which
important matters remain to be specified by administrative regulation. . . . [In addition,]
there may be important facts in the real world (e.g., the cost, cost-effectiveness, and safety
of airbags as compared to other devices) that are unknown at the time of enactment and
that are subject to rapid change over time. . . . [I]n many cases, the member of Congress
would [also] want to assess the force of the argument that a particular state-law scheme is
so important, or so integrally interwoven with other parts of state law, that it should not be
displaced, even if it does interfere to some extent with the federal statutory scheme. It
should be clear that asking a legislator to try to specify in advance a textual preemption
standard that is responsive to these considerations is asking the impossible.”).
114 See id. at 17–18.
115 Id. at 46.
116 See Meltzer, supra note 4, at 345 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s judicial passivity has rendered it more difficult for Congress to legislate effectively.”).
117 Id. at 409.
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eral common law to advance underlying congressional purposes—whether
based on the assumption that the courts are distrusted agents or on other
grounds—“poses threats to the effectiveness of congressional legislation
every bit as much as does . . . judicial activism” in holding acts of Congress
unconstitutional.118
D.

Qualification and Illustrative Examples

Dan’s careful pairing of the threat of “judicial passivity” with that of
“judicial activism” deserves emphasis. He never denied that willful courts
could use ostensibly purposive interpretation as a device for superseding
Congress, not empowering it. Accordingly, in arguing that courts should
interpret statutes based on a common law model, or play the role of junior
partners to Congress, I have not meant to assert that courts should routinely
interpret statutes in ways that stray far from their literal meanings, especially
in response to kinds of problems that Congress reasonably could have foreseen but failed to address. Above I offered a hypothetical example involving
speed limits. A court, I said, should not interpret such a statute as applicable
to other safety hazards, such as distracted driving. A non-hypothetical example comes from Milner v. Department of the Navy,119 in which the government
argued that an exception to the Freedom of Information Act for agency
records “relate[d] solely to the . . . personnel rules and practices”120 applied
to data that the Navy used in designing munitions storage facilities.121 However great the Navy’s policy interests in resisting disclosure, the Court rightly
concluded that the problem to which the government sought to apply the
statute was too far removed from the one that Congress had set out to
address.122
A more testing example for Dan’s interpretive approach comes from the
question whether, and if so when, the courts should construe federal statutes
that impose regulatory duties as impliedly creating private rights to sue. The
best short discussion of which I know comes in the dialogic juxtaposition of
arguments and counterarguments that Dan wrote for the Fourth Edition of
Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System123 and that subsequent editions have substantially reproduced.124 In my judgment, the recognition of an implied right to sue represents the kind of major policy
118 Id. at 410.
119 131 S. Ct. 1259 (2011).
120 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (2012).
121 Milner, 131 S. Ct. at 1262–63.
122 Id. at 1264–74.
123 RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 841–43 (4th ed. 1996). The powerful
point-counterpoint organization of the discussion recalls David Shapiro’s observation that
“an author’s ability to make compelling statements of contrasting views is, for me, a powerful indicator of the author’s worth as a scholar.” David L. Shapiro, Foreword, A Cave Drawing for the Ages, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1834, 1834 (1999).
124 In the most recently published Seventh Edition, see supra note 19, at 741–43.
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judgment that a junior partner ought not lightly make on her own. That
said, I believe that the Supreme Court ought to interpret statutes written during the era when federal courts commonly recognized implied rights of
action in light of then-prevailing interpretive practices on which Congress
might reasonably have relied.125
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in King v. Burwell126 offers a last,
illustrative example of the common law or junior partnership model in practice. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA or “the Act”)
seeks to expand the provision of health care through a series of interlocking
reforms. One “bars insurers from taking a person’s health into account when
deciding whether to sell health insurance or how much to charge.”127
Another provides for the creation of an “Exchange” in each state “that allows
people to compare and purchase insurance plans.”128 The Act initially provides that each state shall establish an Exchange but subsequently adds that if
a state fails to do so, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS)
“shall . . . establish and operate such Exchange within the State.”129 The Act
gives tax credits to purchasers of insurance by saying that the credits are available to a taxpayer who has purchased insurance through “an Exchange established by the State.”130 The central question in King was whether the language
making tax credits available for purchases of insurance through “an
Exchange established by the State” meant that those purchasing insurance
on Exchanges established by the Secretary of HHS in states that had failed to
establish Exchanges of their own could not qualify for tax credits.131
By a vote of six to three, the Supreme Court sensibly and appropriately
held that the relevant language, read in context, authorizes tax credits for
purchasers of insurance on federally as well as state operated Exchanges.132
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts began by noting, as I have
emphasized, that “the meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases
may only become evident when placed in context.”133 He continued by recognizing that “[i]f we give the phrase ‘the State that established the
Exchange’ its most natural meaning,”134 a variety of other features of the Act
could not operate as plainly contemplated. And, as he pointed out in conclu125 It has not always done so. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001)
(“Respondents would have us revert in this case to the understanding of private causes of
action that held sway 40 years ago when Title VI was enacted. . . . Having sworn off the
habit of venturing beyond Congress’s intent, we will not accept respondents’ invitation to
have one last drink.”).
126 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
127 Id. at 2485; see 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2012).
128 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2485; see 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1).
129 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)(1).
130 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2487 (quoting 26 U.S.C. §§ 36B(b)(2)(A), 36B(c)(2)(A) (2012)).
131 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2487–88.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 2489 (quoting Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
526 U.S. 120, 132 (2000)).
134 Id. at 2490.
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sion: “Congress passed the Affordable Care Act to improve health insurance
markets, not to destroy them. If at all possible, we must interpret the Act in a
way that is consistent with the former, and avoids the latter.”135 Under these
circumstances, the Court determined that the statute’s provision of tax credits for purchases on “an Exchange established by the State” was ambiguous,
not plain on its face,136 and was best interpreted to embrace purchases on an
Exchange established and operated by the federal government when a State
had failed to establish an exchange of its own.137
King exemplifies the role of the courts in construing statutes to assist
Congress in the realization of its central purposes in enacting legislation. It
also may illustrate some of the risks that attend that role. In ascribing to
Congress the aim “to improve health insurance markets, not to destroy
them,”138 the Court formulated Congress’s relevant intent at what textualists
frequently characterize as a high “level of generality.”139 Doing so, textualists
often say, risks substituting judicial for congressional judgment.140 Textualists also insist with considerable frequency that when Congress uses “precise”
language—as it arguably did when providing tax credits for insurance purchased through “an Exchange established by the State”—its precision should
be read to signal that it meant to deprive the courts of any interpretive flexibility that more general language might have authorized.141
Although arguments such as these call attention to real hazards, intimations that abstract references to levels of generality and statutory precision
135 Id. at 2496.
136 See id. at 2491.
137 See id. at 2493–96.
138 Id. at 2496.
139 See, e.g., John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2004 (2009) (applauding an interpretive approach built
upon “the related propositions that lawmaking entails compromise, that enacted texts
select means as well as ends, and that abstracting from a law’s specific means to its general
aims dishonors the level of generality at which lawmakers choose to legislate” (emphasis
omitted)); Manning, supra note 24, at 19–20 (criticizing “purposivist” approaches under
which “legislative supremacy operates at a high level of generality” on the ground that such
approaches “mak[e] it harder for Congress to . . . choose statutory means—and, in particular, to write incoherent, overbroad, or incomplete legislation”). In King, Justice Scalia thus
protested in dissent that “[n]o law pursues just one purpose at all costs.” 135 S. Ct. at 2504
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
140 See, e.g., John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 1939, 1975 (2011) (“[W]hen a court abstracts from the specific to the general, the
level of generality at which it enforces statutory policy reflects judicial, and not legislative,
choice.”).
141 See, e.g., King, 135 S. Ct. at 2502 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“To begin with, ‘even the
most formidable argument concerning the statute’s purposes could not overcome the clarity [of] the statute’s text.’” (quoting Kloeckner v. Solis, 133 S. Ct. 596, 607 n.4 (2012)));
Manning, supra note 140, at 1973 (“Treating a precise text as a placeholder for a more
general background purpose or treating a broadly framed text as the placeholder for a
more precise rule negates the lawmaker’s ability to determine the appropriate level(s) of
generality at which to frame diverse provisions of law.”).
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can resolve actual cases, including King, are typically either self-contradictory
or question-begging. It borders on self-contradiction to assert that courts
should avoid imputing purposes to Congress at a high level of generality
while maintaining that the use of “precise” language likely reflects a highorder congressional purpose of narrowly restricting courts’ exercise of interpretive judgment. And it is often question-begging to label language as precise when the question for decision is whether, in context, a term is precise,
vague, ambiguous, or possibly even demonstrably imprecise. The ACA’s reference to “an Exchange established by a State” furnishes a case in point.
As the majority opinion in King documented, the Affordable Care Act is
a statute of nearly one thousand pages that “contains more than a few examples of inartful drafting” and “does not reflect the type of care and deliberation that one might expect of such significant legislation.”142 Legislation of
its kind, as of many other kinds, cannot be implemented successfully unless
the courts assume the role of a junior partner to Congress.143 Dissenting in
King, Justice Scalia protested that “[i]t is entirely plausible that tax credits
were restricted to state Exchanges deliberately—for example, in order to
encourage States to establish their own Exchanges.”144 But he placed little
weight on that unlikely speculation concerning the origins of the provision
most centrally at issue145—a statutory anomaly that emerged only after
months of scrutiny of the ACA by lawyers who had opposed its enactment
and implementation from the start.146 Justice Scalia’s deeper objection
seemed to be that the Court had sought to “assist” Congress in making the
Act workable147 when he thought it should have sent Congress back to the
drawing board to reconsider whether and if so how to fix a statute that his
interpretation would have rendered dysfunctional.148 As I shall discuss more
fully below, Dan Meltzer thought that approach more a disservice than a service to political democracy, and I could not agree more emphatically.

142 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492 (majority opinion).
143 Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in King came close to acknowledging as much at
one point. See id. at 2500 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Affordable Care Act spans 900
pages; it would be amazing if its provisions all lined up perfectly with each other. This
Court ‘does not revise legislation . . . just because the text as written creates an apparent
anomaly.’” (quoting Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2033 (2014))).
For a perceptive discussion of the challenges that the diversity of kinds of modern statutes
and the means of their assemblage in Congress pose for interpreting courts, see Abbe R.
Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress’s Plan in the Age of Unorthodox
Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 96–109 (2015).
144 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2505.
145 See id. at 2502–05 (discussing statutory design largely without allusion to purpose).
146 See, e.g., Gluck, supra note 143, at 62–63, 69–70.
147 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2507 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
148 See id. at 2506.
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III. CONFRONTING SOME PROBLEMS
Having explicated the view that the federal courts should imagine themselves as junior partners to Congress when interpreting federal statutes, I
shall respond briefly to a few well-known objections.
A.

The Separation of Powers

One criticism maintains that Article III limits the courts to applying the
law, not making it.149 Stated in crude form, this objection mistakes a banality
for an argument. Article III authorizes the federal courts to decide cases and
controversies. In doing so, the courts must apply Congress’s directives in
cases to which those directives apply. In statutory interpretation cases, however, the question is what statutes mean and whether, as properly interpreted, they apply to the facts at issue. Far from forbidding courts to
interpret statutes to ascertain what they mean in context, Article III requires
courts to do so.
In an article entitled Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, Professor
John Manning makes a subtler argument.150 According to him, “the structural policies implicit in the constitutional separation of lawmaking from
judging and the requirements of bicameralism and presentment” rule out a
common law approach to statutory interpretation.151 But evidence concerning historical understanding in the Founding era is mixed,152 and subsequent history is much more consistent with purposivism than with a narrow
textualism. As Dan once wrote, “‘[i]s’ may not be ‘ought,’ but claims that
judicial practices are politically illegitimate are far more difficult to sustain
when those practices are widespread and longstanding and when there is a
pattern not of congressional opposition but, instead, of apparent congressional acquiescence.”153
Other commentators have offered a further, related objection. As Dan
frankly acknowledged, judicial interpretation shades into judicial lawmaking
along a spectrum.154 So recognizing, he did not shrink from defending a
149 See, e.g., id. at 2505 (“The Court’s decision reflects the philosophy that judges
should endure whatever interpretive distortions it takes in order to correct a supposed flaw
in the statutory machinery. That philosophy ignores the American people’s decision to
give Congress ‘[a]ll legislative Powers’ enumerated in the Constitution. . . . They made
Congress, not this Court, responsible for both making laws and mending them.” (quoting
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1)).
150 Manning, supra note 22.
151 Id. at 127.
152 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial
Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 990 (2001) (arguing
that early American practice in interpreting statutes was not narrowly textualist).
153 Meltzer, supra note 31, at 1893 (footnotes omitted).
154 See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 4, at 379 (noting that because “the line between statutory interpretation and federal common lawmaking is indistinct, it would make little sense
to address only purposive interpretation or federal common lawmaking rather than both”
(footnote omitted)).
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robust role for the federal courts in crafting federal common law.155 According to Professor Bradford Clark, the Supremacy Clause of Article VI marks
the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States as the exclusive
embodiments of valid federal law and thus precludes any judicial lawmaking
role that strays beyond the bounds of interpretation, broadly defined.156 If
advanced as a historical thesis about the original public meaning of Article
III and its relation to Article VI, however, Professor Clark’s thesis is far from
clearly correct.157 Moreover, given grounds for doubt, I would follow Dan in
resisting the basing of important constitutional conclusions on originalist historical claims alone.158 Under these circumstances, other factors matter and,
what is more, strongly support the conclusion that the federal courts have the
constitutional authority to play a common lawmaking role. The conclusion
that the Supremacy Clause forbids federal common lawmaking is hard to
square with longstanding, widespread practice and judicial precedent.159
Finally, as Dan emphasized, a rejection of all federal common lawmaking
would be pragmatically and prudentially unattractive.160 In an opinion that
Dan much admired, Justice Jackson once wrote: “Were we bereft of the common law, our federal system would be impotent. This follows from the recog-

155 He initially sounded that theme in his first published article, see Daniel J. Meltzer,
State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1128, 1131–32 (1986), in which he
argued that federal common law should govern the circumstances in which state courts
could permissibly decline to entertain federal claims that criminal defendants had failed to
raise in compliance with state procedural rules.
156 See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L.
REV. 1321, 1323–24 (2001).
157 See, e.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
731, 742–55 (2010).
158 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Appraising the Significance of the Subjects and Objects of the
Constitution: A Case Study in Textual and Historical Revisionism, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 453, 477
(2013) (arguing that courts should proceed with caution when urged to upset settled doctrine based on recent, contestable historical and linguistic evidence).
159 As Professor Monaghan points out, Clark’s thesis that only the Constitution and
statutes can occupy the status of federal law is difficult to reconcile with the Supreme
Court’s frequent recognition of the de facto lawmaking power of federal administrative
agencies. See Monaghan, supra note 157, at 757; see also Meltzer, supra note 31, at 1893
(“[C]laims that judicial practices are politically illegitimate are far more difficult to sustain
when those practices are widespread and longstanding . . . .”).
160 As Dan put it:
On that view, not only administrative regulations and valid executive orders but
also federal common law would neither bind the states under the Supremacy
Clause nor provide the basis for district court or Supreme Court jurisdiction. . . .
[In addition,] state courts, for example, would not violate the Supremacy Clause
if they denied federal judgments any preclusive effect, for, as the Supreme Court
has made clear (in an opinion by Justice Scalia), that preclusive effect is a product
of federal common law.
Meltzer, supra note 4, at 381 (footnotes omitted).
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nized futility of attempting all-complete statutory codes.”161 Dan amplified
that argument in his article on statutory preemption.162
B.

Legislation as Compromise

In their litany of complaints about purposive approaches to statutory
interpretation, textualists recurrently point out that legislation frequently
embodies compromises.163 From this truism it follows, textualists sometimes
continue, that construing legislation in light of imputed coherent purposes
risks upsetting possibly unprincipled congressional bargains and deprives
Congress of the capacity to negotiate deals—which may stop short of doing
all that full realization of otherwise reasonably imputed purposes would
require—with assurance that the deals will stick.164 One fallacy of this argument emerges from a narrowly logical point. Even if one assumes (as textualists insist) that the text of a statute provides the only reliable evidence of the
compromise that a statute embodies, one must still interpret the statute in
order to ascertain what the compromise was.
In a prominent version of the argument that courts should eschew any
junior partnership role in interpreting statutes in order to avoid upsetting
legislative compromises, Judge Frank Easterbrook relies heavily on the example of implied rights to sue, which I discussed briefly above.165 As I suggested
then, recognition or non-recognition of an implied right of action makes a
major difference both to a statute’s benefits (for example, in providing compensation for and deterrence against violations) and to its costs (for example, in subjecting regulated parties to costly litigation of unfounded and even
frivolous claims in some instances). Accordingly, courts, in my view, should
not assume that a reasonable legislature that had decided to ban race- or
gender-based discrimination, for example, would necessarily have intended
to license implied private remedies. Easterbrook, however, seeks to go further by appealing to implied-right-of-action cases to support a proposed “distinction between application and interpretation.”166 According to him, one
should determine whether a statute “applies” to an issue or problem based
on the statute’s text; if not, courts have no proper role in “interpreting” it to
fill in “gaps,” for doing so goes beyond the terms of the legislative deal that a
statute embodies.167
In my view, Easterbrook’s proposed distinction fails to mark an intelligible, coherently enforceable difference. It is much too glib to insist categorically that it requires no interpretation to conclude that prohibitory statutes
that fail to provide expressly for private remedies do not “apply” to private
161 D’Oench, Duhme & Co., Inc. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 470 (1942)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
162 See Meltzer, supra note 10, at 56–57.
163 See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 14, at 540; Manning, supra note 24, at 21–26.
164 See Easterbrook, supra note 14, at 544–47.
165 See supra notes 123–25 and accompanying text.
166 Easterbrook, supra note 14, at 535.
167 Id. at 546–47.
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suits to enforce such statutes. So to assert assumes the answer to a question
that may sometimes be a difficult one. At one time, for example, the federal
courts routinely upheld implied private rights of action.168 When Congress
legislated during that period, the context may sometimes have supported an
inference that Congress, along with other reasonable observers, would have
anticipated that courts would construe a statute as incorporating an implied
right to sue in the absence of statutory language indicating the contrary.169
As I noted above, Judge Easterbrook has himself emphasized that courts
should construe legislation in light of reasonable assumptions arising from
background legal practices and traditions.170
If Congress wants to enact a compromise of any kind, it is of course free,
within constitutional limits, to do so. But it is impossible to identify compromises or their terms without interpreting statutes’ language in light of
their structure and history.
C.

Over-Optimism About Courts?

A third issue arises on the practically minded plane onto which Dan frequently sought to direct legal argumentation: Overall, will encouraging
courts to embrace the role of junior partners to Congress produce a better
system of reasonably democratic lawmaking than would limiting the courts to
the status of distrusted agents whose discretion Congress would want to cabin
as far as possible? I laid out Dan’s view as I understand it—which I, again,
find wholly persuasive—in Part II. Because many would challenge his position, let me say a bit more in its defense.
In his writings about statutory interpretation and federal common lawmaking, Dan undoubtedly displayed an optimistic view about federal judicial
competence. Part of the optimism rested on assumptions about institutional
perspective. As Dan emphasized, Congress lacks the capacity to anticipate
the myriad of factual situations to which a statute might imaginably apply.171
By contrast, courts are well situated to engage in fine tailoring.172 Emphasizing this distinction in institutional perspectives, Dan did not disparage Congress or “the [d]ignity of legislation.”173 Rather, he trained his gaze
168 See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964); HART & WECHSLER, supra note
19, at 739.
169 See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 381
(1982).
170 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
171 See Meltzer, supra note 4, at 387 (noting “the incapacity of legislators, no matter how
willing to try to resolve statutory uncertainties, to anticipate all of the uncertainties that will
arise, as well as the difficulties of crafting language that, in the myriad contexts to which it
is applied, will avoid ambiguity”).
172 See id. at 396 (“Often the pertinent legal question ‘is difficult, if not impossible, to
answer in gross. And the courts are functionally better adapted to engage in the necessary
fine tuning than is the legislature.’” (quoting Shapiro, supra note 69, at 574)).
173 See generally JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION (1999).
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overwhelmingly on the cases that Congress had likely not foreseen or had not
had in mind when legislating.
Admittedly, however, Dan’s optimism about courts ran deeper. When
courts confront occasions for the exercise of a junior partner’s role in interpreting statutes or crafting federal common law, Dan expected them to meet
a high standard. In this respect, his position largely tracked that of David
Shapiro, his and my longtime co-author of Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal Courts
and the Federal System.174 In a tribute-paying commentary on David’s work,
entitled Jurisdiction and Discretion Revisited,175 Dan remarked on David’s
optimism about courts with deliberate detachment. “I am confident that a
judiciary composed of David Shapiros would exercise discretion in a fashion
that was sensible and perhaps that would become clear over time, but that is
a different judiciary from the one that we have,” Dan wrote.176 Proceeding
in that vein, he criticized the judge-made doctrine under which federal district courts will sometimes, but only sometimes, accept jurisdiction of a suit
asserting a state law cause of action based on the premise that the suit nevertheless “aris[es] under” federal law.177 In his view, the Supreme Court would
have done better to insist on the discretion-limiting rule that a case does not
arise under federal law unless federal law creates the plaintiff’s cause of
action.178
Dan’s insistence on appraising courts realistically exemplified his intellectual style. After having offered a number of clear-eyed comments on ways
in which courts can go astray, however, he acknowledged that he ultimately
“share[d Shapiro’s] confidence in judicial capacity” and that any difference
between them was “largely at the margin.”179 He explained: “[W]e must
remind ourselves that if the choice is not one between judicial perfection and
legislative shortcoming, neither is it one between legislative perfection and
judicial shortcoming. It is between imperfect alternatives, and I think Shapiro’s argument that a robust judicial role is to be preferred remains entirely
convincing.”180
I shall return below to Dan’s expectation that courts would perform
their functions judiciously. For now, I would only reiterate that much of the
174 Dan described David Shapiro’s position as follows:
First, it views Congress, when enacting jurisdictional grants, as not seeking, and
appropriately not seeking, complete advance specification. Second, it views
courts rather than legislatures as the appropriate institution to provide finegrained specification. Third, it views Congress as having implicitly authorized
such post hoc specification by courts. And finally, it rests on confidence that
judicial elaboration of the reasons for jurisdictional decisions will eventually generate a body of law that is reasonably determinate.
Meltzer, supra note 31, at 1907.
175 Id. at 1891.
176 Id. at 1908.
177 Id. at 1911–15.
178 See id.
179 Id. at 1915.
180 Id. at 1924.
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burden of Dan’s argument for a relatively common law-like judicial role in
the interpretation of statutes and the crafting of federal common law rested
on comparative institutional perspectives, not a belief that courts were always
repositories of exemplary judgment. By the time a case reaches the courts,
the sometimes discrete set of issues raised by that case and others like it may
have come much more sharply into focus than at the time when Congress
drafted a statute. Dan believed that complicated issues should be resolved
not inadvertently but by institutions that had thought them through.
D.

Rhetoric and Comparative Risks

Part I argued that the judicial role in interpreting statutes necessarily
requires the ascription of purposes to the legislature and the resolution of
cases in light of those ascribed purposes. As I said at the conclusion of Part I,
I believe that its schematic account of what courts necessarily do suffices to
establish that they can and must function as junior partners of the legislature
in important respects. As I also noted, however, some textualists would register no dissent from my claims in Sections I.A and I.B but would nonetheless
disagree with much that I have said subsequently.
If the analysis of Sections I.A and I.B would not provoke objections, but
the subsequent applications of that analysis would nevertheless prove contentious, a question obviously arises about the exact locus of disagreement
between Dan and me, on one hand, and moderate textualists, on the other.
A partial answer to that question almost surely resides in judgments about the
appropriate choice of rhetorical frameworks and the comparative risks that
alternative frameworks may carry.181 The rhetoric of faithful agency may
imply that courts should assume that Congress intended to dictate specific
answers to the questions that courts confront, even if it takes the exercise of
judgment to determine what that answer is. By contrast, the language of junior partnership may encourage courts to exercise more independent judgment. If one viewed the courts as inevitably having dangerous tendencies to
pursue their naked policy preferences in the guise of adjudication, one
might think it desirable to insist on a description of the judicial function that
emphasizes faithful agency and the greatest possible subordination of judges’
policymaking role to the dictates of statutory language.182
In the present climate of interpretive debate, however, I do not hold that
view. As Dan emphasized, the judicial “passivity” that he identified in relatively wooden interpretations of statutory language—which the rhetoric of
textualism abets and encourages—can entail serious costs of its own.183 To
181 Cf. Meltzer, supra note 10, at 46 (“[I]f, as I urge, courts are to play a large lawmaking role in preemption cases—one that necessarily involves their exercising judgment
about complicated matters—there remains an important question about the attitude with
which they undertake that responsibility.”).
182 See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. REV. 849, 862 (1989)
(praising originalist over non-originalist approaches to constitutional adjudication on similar grounds).
183 See Meltzer supra note 4, at 409–10.
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offer just one example, in the absence of a sympathetic reconstruction of
congressional purposes, complex regulation of the kind attempted in the
Affordable Care Act might frequently prove unworkable.184 Considering the
balance of costs and benefits, Dan believed that the risks of courts viewing
themselves as distrusted agents exceed those of courts viewing themselves as
Congress’s trusted junior partners. Among other things, a court that views
itself as distrusted may end up regarding Congress as comparably untrustworthy, possibly even capricious. No one should welcome this outlook.
In a further argument involving comparative risks, textualists sometimes
say that, whatever the governing interpretive rules are, it is important for
those rules to be clear and fixed in order to permit Congress to discharge its
constitutional responsibilities.185 Purposive interpretation, they maintain,
leaves Congress uncertain about the significance of the language that it
adopts. If the courts will simply lay down clear interpretive rules and abide
by them, rather than presuming themselves to be junior partners in lawmaking with the authority to do what Congress ought to have done (if the courts
are correct in their ascription of congressional purposes), then Congress will
adjust and legislate for the future with those clear rules in mind.186
This argument exhibits two deficiencies. First, as I argued above, it misunderstands how language works—both in law and in life more generally—
and, as a result, could not be implemented consistently. Second, arguments
that Congress will adjust to clearly propounded judicial rules of interpretation fail to reckon adequately with empirical studies showing that Congress
tends not to adjust to the Supreme Court’s methodological pronouncements,
at least in the short term, largely because members of Congress and their
staffs know less about the Court’s interpretive practices than textualists
appear to assume.187 Busy legislators and even busy legislative staff do not
study or internalize the methodological sections of judicial opinions. In theory, they might. And if they did, they would—in theory—adjust. In practice,
however, members of Congress and their staffs persist in their assumption
that the courts, by relying on legislative history and otherwise, will seek to
identify Congress’s animating purposes in enacting legislation and to interpret legislation practically, in light of those purposes.188 Given this state of
184 See Gluck, supra note 143, at 80–93 (emphasizing the importance of imputing a
coherent plan to Congress in enacting the Affordable Care Act).
185 See, e.g., Manning, supra note 24, at 70 n.408.
186 See id. (“At some level, it may not matter all that much whether the Court always
‘gets it right,’ as long as it is consistent. ‘What is of paramount importance is that Congress
be able to legislate against a background of clear interpretive rules, so that it may know the
effect of the language it adopts.’” (quoting Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556
(1989))).
187 See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—
An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV.
901, 907 (2013) (discussing “disconnected canon[s]” of construction of which the congressional staff who draft legislation often have no awareness and noting that “clear statement
rules” are a prime example).
188 See id. at 970.
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affairs, Dan opted decisively for an approach that he expected to work reasonably well in practice over one that might work better in theory, but likely
only in theory.
CONCLUSION: DAN MELTZER

AND

LAW’S OPTIMISM

As a champion of a common law approach to legal interpretation, Dan
was a celebrant and practitioner of what the legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin called law’s “optimism.”189 For Dworkin, law’s optimism inhered in an
approach to interpretation that the common law exemplifies.190 That
approach encourages the reading of texts in light of the values and purposes
that underlie them. And it encourages judges, in ascribing purposes to texts,
to view them charitably, as reflecting values and purposes worth extending
into the future.191 As applied to the interpretation of statutes, this approach
presupposes that courts can play a useful role, not only in assisting Congress,
but also, by doing so, in promoting justice and human welfare.
Once again an objection looms. I have addressed it already, but it bears
repeating. That objection maintains that we should celebrate legislatures as
much as courts and accord legislative choices the dignity that they deserve,
especially by insisting that courts must not alter the legislature’s judgments.
We might describe this objection as rooted in democracy’s optimism. And
some will say that democracy’s optimism requires a minimization of the judiciary’s creative role: although courts must inevitably ascribe purposes to the
legislature, for courts to cast themselves as the legislature’s junior partners
risks usurping the legislative function.
As I have tried to show, this objection typically assumes, without demonstrating, its essential premise. No adherent of a common law model doubts
the authority of the legislature to make binding decisions. Among other
things, the legislature can always amend a statute to correct what it regards as
a judicial misinterpretation. In statutory interpretation cases, however, the
threshold question always involves what the legislature has decided already—
and, in the kinds of cases with which Dan was most concerned, with whether
the legislature should be treated as having decided a question that those who
drafted the statute had never had occasion to think about specifically. In
giving a negative answer to that question, Dan in no way disparaged democracy. Rather, he embraced a view about the role that a democracy can assign,
and that our democracy sensibly has assigned, to the courts.
In short, Dan was an optimist both about courts and about democracy.
His optimism with respect to both explains why he devoted so much of his
professional life to studying the role of the federal courts in the federal system. Thinking theoretically, but with an acute sensitivity to practical consequences, he made it a central project of his professional life to illuminate the
role that courts should play in making our distinctive scheme of democratic
189 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 407 (1986).
190 See id. at 238–58.
191 See id. at 254–58, 413.
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lawmaking the best that it can be. In combining theoretical sophistication
with context-sensitive practical wisdom, the contributions of Daniel J. Meltzer
were, and remain, unsurpassed.
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